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ABSTRACT 
Jordan in Transition: 
A Comparative Analysis of Operanonal Codes for 
King Hussein I and King Abdullah II. (April 2001) 
Dwain Leland Sparling 
Department of Political Science 
Texas A&M University 
Fellows Advisor: Dr. Gary Halter 
Department of Political Science 
After King Abdullah II inherited the throne from King Hussein I at a very critical 
transition point in 1999, it became necessary for a study to rigorously examine the 
fundamental characteristics of each leaders' outlooks on the political realm. 
Additionally, it created a unique opportunity to gauge the effects of a leadership 
transition period on a leader's policy preferences, as well as the changes in direction for 
future political action in the region. This study utilized the Verbs In Context System to 
code six randomly selected texts from each lcadcr to construct operational code indices 
for both Hussein and Abdullah during two time periods: continuous, sustained periods of 
leadership, and the year of rule either before or after the transition point (depending on 
which leaderis being considered). Mean values for each leader were computed on nine 
operational code indices spanning both philosophical and instrumental beliefs: Nature of 
the Political Universe, Realization of Political Values, Predictability of Others, Control 
over Historical Development, Role of Chance, Approach to Goals, Pursuit of Goals, 
Timing of Action, and Utility of Means. Two-factor ANOVA tests checked for variation 
over time with respect to leader, time period, and any possible interaction between these 
factors. The resulting data sets show that, barring some differences in relanon to the 
negative characterization of the political universe, both Hussein and Abdullah possessed 
a propensity toward very cooperative means in approaching the political arena. These 
operational codes did not vary across time and the leaders did not differ much from each 
other in their characterization of and action in the political environment. Overall, 
Hussein and Abdullah tested to be very similar to each other in operational codes, and we 
can expect Abullah to pursue the policies that were begun by Hussein in an effort to 
preserve the moderate stance that the nation has historically taken with respect to the 
Middle East peace process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The geography and politics of the nation of Jordan have placed this seemingly 
small, inconspicuous country within a context that is central to the movement and 
direction of the Middle East peace process. The recent transition of leadership to King 
Abdullah II upon King Hussein's death in 1999 makes it a necessity to assess the critical 
stances that the new leadership takes with respect to reaching any mutually-acceptable 
agreement with Israel and its other surrounding Arab nations. In addition, it is important 
to look at the effects of what foreign policy stances have been and will be inherited or 
rejected by this new leadership, and how this inheritance or rejection will influence 
Jordan's role in the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict. To date, qualitative studies have 
found that the "experiences of the 1990's have lefl Jordan. . . with the [new] capacity to 
articulate its preferences [to the intentational arena]" (Lynch, 1999, p. 270), leaving open 
important questions that little or no quanttqative research has attempted to answer. 
Although there are many ways to approach questions concerning the use of 
political power by national leaders, the single fact remains that it is necessary to 
concentrate on the decision-maker as an individual with a unique and personal approach 
to the political arena. Furthermore, it is imperative that research on such an intangible 
and fluid concept as that of the human psyche make its measurements via empirical 
evidence and a methodology that is replicable and robust. One such research 
methodology which has proven itself valuable and accurate in both political science and 
behavioral science circles is operational code analysis using the Verbs In Context 
This thesis follows the style and format of Poluical Psychology. 
System. The VICS protocol, as developed by Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998), 
concentrates on the verbs used by political leaders in various forms of communication as 
the source of information regarding a leader's fundamental beliefs. This quantitative data 
is then used in this analysis to construct profiles of how Hussein I and Abdullah II 
characterize political actors and utilize their power both within and outside of the 
boundaries of Jordan. Each leader is then analyzed under two-factor ANOVA and simple 
effects tests in order to assess the sources of variation in operational codes across time. 
To summarize, the general objective of this research is to comparatively investigate to 
what extent Jordan's transition from King Hussein I to King Abdullah II has affected the 
nation's approach to the Middle East peace process, as well as how it addresses its own 
domestic needs. 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Jordan and Israel Before the Treaty 
The conflict in the Middle East, which is embodied by the contest of the Arabs 
and the Israelis over the lands of Palestine, has been a fact of life for the inhabitants of 
the region for centuries. The relatively recent return of Jews from across the world to 
build the state of Israel in 1948 made the conflict a salient matter for the modern world. 
It was a moment in the annals of history when a regional collection of many independent 
nation-states formed identities and perspectives which to this day remain critical to the 
political dynamics of Arab-Israeli relations. Shortly after this turning point, the relatively 
small and centrally-located nation of Jordan saw a new, young leader ascend to the 
throne of its constitutional, hereditary monarchy. King Hussein I came to power in an 
age when Arab attitudes toward the state of Israel were both bitter and potent, and saw 
the loss of the strategic portion of land known as the West Bank to Israel during the Six 
Day War of 1967. He also became the new protector of the millions of Palestinian 
refugees that were displaced from their land in Palestine when Israel took possession of it 
in 1948, instantaneously acquiring the need to rule his own Jordanian subjects and to 
strike a delicate balance in meeting the needs of an uprooted and unsettled Palestinian 
constituency. 
Hussein proved to be a valuable leader that directed his nation fltrough violent 
times and constant dissension that existed even within his own borders. Nationalist 
ideologies differed between the Palestinians and the Jordanians, leading to bloody 
uprisings in 1970 and 1971. He survived a coup attempt in 1957 and numerous attempts 
on his life by various factions, despite his attempts to quell tensions among his people. 
Although he encountered troubles of this sort, his authority and political legitimacy were 
not widely questioned, as was the case with most of the leaders in Arab countries at the 
time. Overall, Hussein was a very successful leader that served as a stabilizing factor in 
the equation of Middle Eastern relations, leading to a peace treaty that effectively ended a 
50-year state of war with Israel in 1994. 
Jordanian Leadership Since 1994 
This study begins its comparative analysis of leaders at a definitive point in the 
timeline of the peace process with Israel: July 26, 1994. On this day, Israel and Jordan 
entered into The Washington Agreement, which "jointly reaffirmed the five underlying 
principles of their understanding on an Agreed Common Agenda designed to reach the 
goal of a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace between the Arab States and the 
Palestinians, with Israel" (Laqueur, 1995, p. 655). This agreement was the predecessor to 
the historic Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty in October of the same year, which explicitly 
ended the state of war between the two nations. In addition, Jordan's internal politics of 
the 1990's were greatly influenced by Hussein's foreign policies and the almost amiable 
disposition toward Israel that led to their peace Meaty. This cooling of hostilities 
continued to propel Jordan in the direction it had always been by Hussein: one of 
moderation in the region. 
The late 1990's saw the faltering health of Hussein as his body was taken over by 
cancer, and treatments left him weak and absent from his coun~ for sustained periods of 
time. His death in 1999 saw him depart from a nation with 6. 3 million constituents, 
about one-quarter of which were registered Palestinian refugees. These subjects were 
entrusted to his heir, Abdullah II, who ascended to the throne on June 23 that same year. 
King Abdullah II is of particular interest to the peace process due to the fact that he is 
married to Queen Rania, a woman of Palestinian descent. Additionally, he seems 
interested in continuing the policy directions of Hussein, yet at the same time he has had 
little experience in domestic politics and international diplomacy. The major issues 
which Abdullah faces in his new position are (I) reaching a final status agreement with 
Israel to address the question of Palestine, (2) overcoming economic hardship and 
scarcity of resources, (3) improving inter-Arab relations, and (4) modernizing the 
Jordanian military. An immediate concern for the throne that is perhaps second only to 
reaching a final status agreement is ridding the region of the new Intifada-esque violence 
that has continuously flared in the Palestinian-Israeli border regions since late September 
of last year. Abdullah is not alone in pursuing these daunting tasks, however. The last 
two years have seen a younger generation of Arabs inherit the leadership of Morocco and 
Syria with the ascendance of King Mohammed and Bashar Assad, respectively. 
Crushing economic concerns and the ever-present reality of Israel are forcing them to 
reconsider upholding the ideological reasons for conflict their fathers held in order to 
reach a peace agreement that will benefit their individual domestic scenes. 
METHODOLOGY 
Research Objective 
The transition's recency has placed this research on the forefront of deciphering 
the cognitive constructs of Hussein and Abdullah and placing them within the context of 
a comparative analysis. To date, only qualitative research has made gestures toward this 
end, and a more rigorous research design is called for in order to answer the unique 
questions that the change in leadership for Jordan has posed. Therefore, the quantitative 
effort of this analysis will serve to determine how the predispositions and preferences of 
Abdullah are similar to or different from those of Hussein, thus supporting or rejecting 
the qualitative data that demonstrates the seemingly high degree of similarity between 
these two leaders. Finally, analysis across time is required to discover if and to what 
extent Hussein and Abdullah were influenced by a period of continuous rule versus the 
year preceding and the year following the transition point, respectively. 
Operational Code Analysis 
At this point it is obvious that this analysis has chosen the leader as the decision 
unit, as it compares and contrasts Hussein and Abdullah across time. In following the 
"Decision tree lor determining [the] ultimate decision unit" as developed by Hermann 
and Hermann (1989), the result for each leader was "Decision Unit is Predominant 
Leader. " Thc definition for "predominant leader" as explained in their study relates that 
"a single individual has the power to make the choice for the government. " When this 
definition is evaluated with respect to the broad legislalive and executive powers given to 
the monarch of Jordan, thc justiflcation for analyzing the single leader as thc decision 
unit is clear. Yet, although the monarchy has powers that approach the absolute mark, 
the parliamentary and democratic structure of Jordan's government leads the monarch to 
be a sensitive instrument that is open to many viewpoints, opinions, constituencies, and 
interests involved in making political decisions. Hermann and Hermann make room for 
this pragmatic type of leader within the "Predominant Leader" category (even citing 
Hussein as an example), yet emphasize the need for data sets that encompass more than 
just personality and include other information regarding environment, views of other 
political actors, and prediction of how other governments will act and react (1989, p. 
366). 
The need for examining two predominant leader decision unils from a distance on 
the factors listed above fits nicely within the framework of the operational code analysis 
as constructed by George (1969). His concept of the operational code in that particular 
study is a defined, coherent system of beliefs that guides the decision maker in the 
cognitive deliberation of what available altemativcs will be chosen in a given situation. 
This notion of a stable and coherent cognitive consnuct, however, was later revised by 
Holsti (1977) when operational code research found variation within leaders' belief 
systems. The new concept was of flexible states of mind that can vary within the 
individual as well as across time, while preserving some sense of a core (or default) state 
of mind. This new framework then directs attention not to the specific content of a 
decision maker's operational code, bul. rather to the propensities a decision maker has on 
philosophical (perception of political environment) and instrumental (exercise of polilical 
power) levels (Walker, 1998, p. 176). 
The Verbs In Context System 
The Verbs In Context System was developed by Walker, Schafer and Young in 
order to discern an "individual's 'state of mind' [as] articulated in public texts trom 
which we infer propensities for a) diagnosing occasions for decision, b) making choices 
among the decision alternatives, and c) shifting among choices" (1997, pp, 5-6), As 
such, the source material gathered in this VICS content analysis consists of the texts of 
public speeches, personal correspondence, interviews, and journal articles by Hussein 
and Abdullah. Each text randomly selected for content analysis had to conform to a 
minimum length of 1, 400 words and possess political content on more than one issue. In 
keeping with the timeframes for this study as mentioned in the Historical Overview, three 
eligible texts were selected at random for both leaders in two time periods for each, 
allowing for analysis of variation in operational codes across time: 
1, July 26, 1994 — February 7, 1998: Hussein's leadership across a 
continuous amount of time after The Washington Agreement, which 
charted the course for the later Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty in October. 
February 8, 1998 — February 7, 1999: Hussein's leadership in the year 
leading up to his death on February 7. This year is used as the hansitional 
time period for Hussein in the operational code analysis. 
February 8, 1999 — February 7, 2000: Abdullah's leadership in the year 
lollowtng the transition point at the date of Hussein's death; this year is 
used as the transitional time period for Abdullah in the operational code 
analysis. Although Hussein was not technically a leader during thc full 
year (he was enthroned in June), he had still been chosen as heir to the 
throne since before Hussein's death, and was already making his policy 
preferences known to the world. 
4. February 8, 2000 — February 1, 2001: Abdullah's leadership across a 
continuous amount of time after the transitional year. The ending date 
was the last day for gathering speeches before the coding for this time 
period in this study began. 
A list of ihe texts coded in this study can be found in the Appendix, and are presented in 
their corresponding time categories as outlined above. 
The detailed VICS coding process used for the texts can be found as an 
extensively outlined method in Appendix 1 of Walker (1997, pp. 38-47), The premise 
for this content analysis is thai the texts, as coded by this thorough process, will reflcct 
the leader's "fundamental predispositions regarding the nature of political life" 
(Crichlow, 1998, p. 689). Essentially, patterns of preferences for characterizing the 
political arena and exercising political power will surface in the quantitative data, 
revealing the operational code of the speaker. The VICS method focuses on the 
politically-related verbs in a text, basing the operational code on the relative frequency of 
different types of verb attributions that are used by the speaker. Each verb construction, 
consisting of a subject, verb, target and context, is then coded for seven different 
categories: Whether 
1. the subject is self or other. 
2. the verb is used for action (transitive) or description (intransitive). 
3. the verb is a word or a deed. 
to 
4. the entire construction is describing a positive or negative word or deed. 
5. the verb category is reward (+3), promise (+2), appeal (+I), oppose (-I), threaten 
(-2), or punish (-3). 
6. the verb tense is past, present, or future. 
7. the topic/context of the verb is foreign or domestic. 
Operational Code Indices 
The operational code construct, as utilized in tandem with the VICS in Crichlow 
(1998), evaluates a leader's profile for nine different indices on two levels, each 
individual text being the unit of analysis. The five philosophical indices measure the 
speaker's characterizations of the political world, and the four instrumental indices 
measure the speaker's propensities toward the use of his political power. Each of these 
indices, with its corresponding formula, is described below. (The following has been 
adapted from Chrichlow, 1998, as the synthesis of Table I on p. 691 and the VICS 
Coding Formulas in the Appendix on pp. 704-5. ) 
The Philosophical Indices 
Nature of the Political Universe 
Description: Range: — 1 & x & 1. A lower (or, negative) score indicates that the 
speaker characterizes his polilical environment to be conflictual; a 
higher (or, positive) score indicates that the speaker characterizes 
his political environment as cooperative. 
Formula: (% positive Other attributions) — (% negative Other attributions) 
Realization of Political Values 
Description: Range: — I & x & 1. A lower (or, negative) score indicates that the 
Formula: 
speaker is pessimistic about achieving his goals; a higher (or, 
positive) score indicates that the speaker is optimistic about 
achieving his goals. 
The mean intensity of Other, transitive, verb categories —: 3. The 
verb categories were coded as reward (+3), promise (+2), appeal 
(+1), oppose (-I), threaten (-2), or punish (-3). 
Predictabilit of Others 
Description: Range: 0 & x & 1. A lower score indicates that the speaker sees 
others as highly unpredictable; a higher score indicates that the 
speaker sees others as highly predictable. 
Formula: I — IQV (the Index of Qualitative Variation). 
IQV = [k(N — f )] —: [N (Ir-I)] where k = number of categories, N 
= number of cases, and f = sum of the squared frequencies. 
The IQV is defined as "a ratio of the number of different pairs of 
observations in a distribution to Ihe maximum possible number of 
different pairs for a distribution with the same N [number of cases] 
and the same number of variable classifications" (Watson & 
McGraw, 1980, pp. 87-90). 
Control over Historical Develo ment 
Description: Range: 0 & x & l. A lower score indicates that the speaker 
characterizes others as having control ol' events; a higher score 
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indicates that the speaker characterizes himself as having control 
of events. 
Formula: (¹ of Self attributions) —: [(¹ of Self attributions) + (¹ of Other 
attributions)]. 
Role of Chance 
Description: Range: 0 & x & l. A higher score indicates that the speaker 
identifies chance as having a greater role in the political arena. 
Formula: 1 — [(Predictability of Others index) x (Control over Historical 
Development index)]. 
Instrumental Indices 
~Ahh G 
Description: Range: -1 & x & l. A lower (or, negative) score indicates that the 
speaker tends to strategizc with conflictual means; a higher (or, 
positive) score indicates that the speaker tends to strategize with 
cooperative means. 
Formula: (% positive Self attributions) — (% negative Self atWbutions). 
Pursuit of Goals 
Description: Range: — 1 & x & l. A lower (or, negative) score indicates that thc 
speaker tends to utilize conflictual means to achieve goals; a 
higher (or, positive) score indicates that the speaker tends to utilize 
cooperative means to achieve goals. 
13 
Formula: The mean intensity of Self verb categories —: 3. The verb 
categories were coded as reward (+3), promise (+2), appeal (+1), 
oppose (-1), threaten (-2), or punish (-3). 
T~ii f A tt 
Description: Range: 0 &x & 1. A lower score indicates that the speaker seldom 
shifts tactical approach between cooperative and conflictual 
means; a higher score indicates that the speaker usually shifts 
tactical approach between cooperative and conflictual means. 
Formula: 1 - 
~(% positive Self attributions) — (% negative Self attributions)~. 
U~tilit f M 
Description: Range: 0 & x & 1. These are the percentages in decimal form for 
each verb category of Reward, Promise, Appeal, Oppose, 
Formula: 
Threaten, and Punish. The higher the percentage, the more 
frequent the usc of the corresponding tactic in a political arena. 
Percentage of each verb category in the total set of transitive verb 
attributions, expressed in decimal form. The verb categories were 
coded as reward (+3), promise (+2), appeal (+1), oppose (-1), 
threaten (-2), or punish (-3). 
Comparative Analysis 
The first set of data results gleaned from statistics gathered during the coding 
process will comprise a table of mean scores on the philosophical and instrumental 
indices for Hussein and Abdullah both during the periods of continual rule and transition, 
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respectively. These numbers, when placed within their corresponding ranges, will show 
to what degree each leader was conflictual or cooperative during each time period. A 
second set of data results will be extracted from the coded texts using a two-factor 
ANOVA (analysis of variance) test for each of the nine indices. These tests will 
demonstrate any sign of variation from two sources, either the Leader effect, the Time 
effect, or an Interaction of the two. The Leader effect tests for vmiation that results from 
how the leaders differ from each other in predisposition toward political environment, 
regardless of time. The Time effect tests for variation that results from how the 
operational codes of the leaders might change over time, without diffcrcntiating between 
individual leaders. The Interaction effect tests for variation that results from a combined 
interaction ofboth differences in leader and change over time. Finally, if any p-values 
for the Interaction effect are statistically significant (i. e. , if p & . 1000), then it will be 
necessary to conduct a simple effects test for the influence of Time to see if one leader 
may have changed over time on an index for which the other did not. 
Expectations and Predictions 
This comparative analysis is predicated on the fact that various informal 
hypotheses based on qualitative data exist concerning the similarities and/or differences 
between the nature of both Hussein's and Abdullah's approaches to domestic and foreign 
policy decisions. It is therefore necessary that this study provide a generalized set of 
expectations for what results the quantitative VICS and operational code framework will 
produce. Numerous press reports and ihe presentation texts contained in press releases 
of the General Assembly of the United Nations provide an informal base of infontiation 
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which have demonstrated Abdullah's overall re-direction of Jordanian foreign policy 
away from the public embrace of the state of Israel that Hussein espoused (i. e. , the 
Timing of Action index should be higher for Abdullah than for Hussein). Abdullah's 
policies have not been driven by peaceful co-existence with Israel as Hussein's were, yet 
this factor still seems to be a key element in Jordan's approach to international politics 
(i. e. , similarity should be expected across the Approach to Goals index). Abdullah has 
also tended to characterize Israel as using conflictual means over the status of Jerusalem 
(a negative value for the Nature of the Political Universe is expected for him). He has 
reached out to other Arab nations for improvements in relations with each, conuasted by 
Hussein who had somewhat divisive relationships with other Arab nations because ol'his 
acceptance of Israel. The Role of Chance appears to dominate present-day Jordan as 
uncertainty of economic future looms large for Abdullah (for whom higher values on this 
index are expected), unlike Hussein who had expected with certainty a final status 
agreement with Israel by 199g (lower values). 
More formal qualitative studies corroborate the press' assessment of differences 
between leaders' approaches (Bronson, 2000; Robinson, 2000). They also address 
variation over time, emphasizing that the recent transitions in leadership should have 
been accompanied by turmoil and vastly differing policy preferences (as based on past 
experiences of Arab leadership transitions). This leads one to predict that a salient 
difference should exist between mean scores for the leaders' periods of transition rule 
and continuous rule. However, as some time had passed before these studies were 
conducted, each was surprised to find that every transition had been a relatively smooth 
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one, informing this study that no substantial difference should appear between the 
transitional and continual periods of rule for Hussein and Abdullah. 
To summarize, this study predicts that: 
I. Abdullah's higher values will appear in Realization of Political Values and 
Timing of Action. 
2. Both leaders should show similarity in Approach to Goals. 
3. Abdullah will have a low to negative number for Nature of the Political 
Universe. 
4. Abdullah should have higher values on the Role of Chance index; Hussein, 
lower values. 
5. Hussein will have higher mean values for the philosophical indices than will 
Abdul1 ah. 
6. If differences occur between the mean values for the periods of continual rule 
and the periods of transition, they should be slight. 
7. Neither leader will score high values on the conflictual indices of the Utility 
ol'Means (he. , the Punish, Threaten, and Oppose) because the nation has been 
characterized as moderate and peaceful in the Middle East conflict dynamic. 
RESULTS 
Data Trends and Patterns 
The results of the coding of each individual text, as processed through the 
formulae for constructing operational code indices, were averaged to produce the mean 
index values presented in Table I. Perhaps the most striking feature of this data set is its 
lack of negative values. Only two negative values appear, and both belong to Abdullah 
during his year of rule after the transition, A value of(-. 83) for Nature of the Political 
Universe shows his striking characterization of the political environment to have been 
very hostile. A value of (-. 11) for Realization of Political Values reveals he was slightly 
pessimistic and felt somewhat helpless in attaining his goals. Sources for these negative 
values could lie in the fact that in mid-1999 Abdullah was having to deal with the 
existence of Islamic militants within Jordan's borders that had links to external networks 
and foreign regimes that were seeking to undermine his leadership. That he was an 
inexperienced diplomat that assumed leadership under the circumstances of a depressed 
economy, Arab disunity, and dissent over the 1994 peace treaty undoubtedly contributed 
to lower values on this index as well. As time passed, the Nature of the Political 
Universe value dramatically increased to a moderate score of (. 13), communicating a 
greater ease with which Abdullah participated in the political universe, Additionally, this 
moderate score demonstrates that he possessed a wariness that kept him from becoming 
too friendly with other political actors or enemies. 
Another trend which is important to note is that Hussein and Abdullah possess 
very similar — in some cases identical — values on four indices: Control over Historical 
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Table L Operational Code Indices for Hussein and Abdullah During Years of Sustained 
Rule and Periods of Transition 
INDEX 
Nature of the Political Universe 
Realization of Political Values 
Predictability of Others 
Control over Historical Development 
Role of Chance 
Approach to Goals 
Pursuit of Goals 
Timing of Action 
Utility of Means (Reward) 
Utility of Means (Promise) 
Utility of Means (Appeal) 
Utility of Means (Oppose) 
Utility of Means (Threaten) 
Utility of Means (Punish) 
MEANS 
Hussein Abdullah Hussein Abdullah 
1990's 2000's Transition Transition 
(n=3) (n=3) (n=3) (n=3) 
0. 42 0. 13 0. 08 -0. 83 
0. 42 0. 07 0. 14 -0. 11 
0. 16 0. 35 0. 55 0. 41 
0. 88 0. 88 0. 86 0. 86 
0. 86 0. 69 0. 46 0. 65 
0. 70 0. 79 0. 57 0. 88 
0. 41 0. 38 0. 30 0. 62 
0. 30 0. 21 0. 43 0. 12 
0. 48 0. 35 0. 38 0. 43 
0. 06 0. 06 0. 02 0. 31 
0. 30 0. 45 0. 43 0. 10 
0. 10 0. 03 0. 08 0. 03 
0. 00 0. 00 0. 01 0. 00 
0. 06 0. 12 0. 09 0. 13 
Development, Utility of Means (Oppose), Utility of Means (Threaten), and Utility of 
Means (Punish). Both leaders clearly felt that they had great control over events (most 
likely an artifact of monarchical rule), and that they knew that a negative utility of means 
was not the most beneficial tactic to use in politics. Yet another pattern in the data shows 
declining values for Hussein over his continual rule in the 1990's up to the transition 
point in 1999. One such index is the Realization of Political Values, which decreases 
from (. 42) to (. 14), most likely a result of Hussein's I'ailing health and inability to be a 
truly effective leader at that point in his life. Similarly, Abdullah saw himself as 
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Table II. Two-Factor ANOVA Results for the Operational Code Indices of for Hussein 
and Abdullah During Years of Sustained Rule and Periods of Transition 
VARIABLE EFFECTS (Two-Factor ANOVA) 
INDEX 
Leader 
F p 
Time 
F p 
Interaction 
F p 
Nature of the Political Universe 5. 58 0. 0774 6. 55 0. 0626 1. 59 0. 2761 
Realization of Political Values 
o+ Predictability of Others 
Control over Historical o 
Development 
Role of Chance 
Approach to Goals 
Pursuit of Goals 
Timing of Action 
Utility of Means (Reward) 
Utility of Means (Promise) 
~B Utility of Means (Appeal) 
Utility of Means (Oppose) 
Utility of Means (Threaten) 
Utility of Means (Punish) 
0. 56 0. 4970 0. 33 0. 5988 0. 01 0. 9109 
0. 01 0. 9211 0. 90 0. 3966 0. 48 0. 5250 
0. 00 1. 0000 0. 11 0. 7533 0. 00 1. 0000 
0. 00 0. 9768 0. 80 0. 4208 0. 51 0. 5165 
0. 71 0. 4479 0. 01 0. 9194 0. 25 0. 6461 
2. 08 0. 2225 0. 42 0. 5530 3. 03 0. 1566 
0. 71 0. 4479 0. 01 0. 9194 0. 25 0. 6461 
0. 08 0. 7937 0. 02 0. 9025 0. 43 0. 5498 
2. 55 0. 1856 1. 34 0. 3120 2. 55 0. 1856 
0. 55 0. 5010 0. 74 0. 4373 3. 72 0. 1259 
1. 96 0. 2342 0. 01 0. 9128 0. 12 0. 7440 
1. 00 0. 3739 1. 00 0. 3739 1. 00 0. 3739 
0. 43 0. 5477 0. 08 0. 7926 0. 02 0. 8835 
ineffectual at reaching goals during the transition period, as described previously by his 
negative score of (-. 11). Last, but not least, both Hussein and Abdullah show very high 
values on the Approach to Goals index during both time periods, emphasizing their 
strong commitment to wholly cooperative means for achieving goals. 
The operational code indices, as individually analyzed through two-factor 
analysis of variance tests, have their results displayed in Table II above. The p-values for 
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the effects of Leader, Time, and an Interaction between the two, become of primary 
concern when significance reaches below the (. 1000) threshold. In this data set, both the 
Leader and Time effects were significant for the Nature of the Political Universe index. 
The Leader effect, with a p-value of (. 0774), shows that regardless of time period, both 
Hussein and Abdullah fundamentally differed on their view of how friendly or hostile the 
political arena was. The Time effect, with ap-value of (. 0626), shows the opposite: that 
with disregard to leader, both Hussein and Abdullah shifted their perception of a friendly 
political climate from lower levels during transitional periods to higher levels during 
periods of sustained rule. Finally, the ANOVA tests found no significant interactions 
between the two effects of leader and time, and therefore no simple effects tests were 
needed. 
Discussion 
In order to gain a greater understanding of how the data trends and pattenis from 
the operational code indices work to achieve the objective this research, it is necessary to 
evaluate the seven expectations and predictions which were in Chapter lll: 
1. Abdullah 's higher values will appear in Realization of Political Values and Timing of 
Action. This bypolhesis was not supported by the data. These values, representing 
both Abdullah's optimism for future chances at reaching a goal and the frequency 
with which he shifted between cooperative and competitive means resulted in some 
of his lowest scores in the operational code (. 07, -. 11, and . 21, . 12) Hussein actually 
had greater Timing of Action values at (. 30 and . 43), meaning that he took a more 
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well-rounded approach to international relations by including a large and complex 
repertoire of action means. 
2. Both leaders should show similarity in Approach to Goals. This hypothesis was 
among the strongest supported by the data, with each leader consistently scoring high 
values: Hussein (. 70) and (. 57) and Abdullah (. 79) and (. 88). An operational code 
with this feature is translated as the total commitment to a wholly cooperative 
approach, therefore Abdullah's higher values on this index should indicate that he is 
more milling to reach agreement than to perpetuate conflict in order to benefit the 
greater good. 
3. Abdullah will have a low to negative number for Nature of the Political Universe. 
This hypothesis was in fact supported by the data, as this value turned out to be the 
most extreme negative value on the operational code for Abdullah as found during 
the transition period. Furthermore, this propensity shifted as the valence increased to 
a positive (. 13) by the time Abdullah reached a point of sustained rule in the years 
2000-200] . 
4. Abdullah should have higher values on the Role of Chance index; Hussein, lower 
values. The amount of chance that Abdullah believed had control over the domain of 
politics remained consistently high across time at (. 65) and (. 69). Hussein's 
attribution of chance's role in politics went from a high (. 86) during continual rule to 
a more moderate (. 46) during the transition period. So while both leaders viewed the 
1'uture with uncertainty of circumstance, they both felt they possessed an ability to 
control subsequent action and events. 
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5. Hussein will have higher mean values for the philosophical indices than will 
Abdullah. This hypothesis attempted to predict that Hussein had a more positive (he. , 
cooperative) outlook on international politics than Abdullah, and turned out to be 
only slightly higher. Both leaders tended to have a relatively low positive view of a 
political environment that consisted of moderately stable actors and a very high 
ability for the self to influence control over events. Finally, each leader felt 
somewhat unable to completely control circumstances as the role of chance was seen 
as having had a great influence over occurrences in the political domain. 
6. Jf differences occur between the mean values for the periods of continual rule and the 
periods of transition, they should be slight. The ANOVA tests of Table II helped 
support this hypothesis in thai there was, in fact, just one slight difference between 
Hussein and Abdullah concerning the Nature of the Political Universe across time. 
The rest of the values on Table II served to demonstrate that the periods of transition 
were, with some small exceptions, similar to longer periods of leadership for both 
Hussein and Abdullah, making both leaders' predispositions constant over time and 
similar in nature and direction. 
7. Neither leader will score high values on the 
conflictual 
indice of the Utility of Means 
(i. e. , the Piinish, Threaten, and Oppose) because the nation has been characterized 
as moderate and peaceful in the Middle East conflict dynamic. This hypothesis was 
overwhelmingly supported by the data in that thc lowest values in the entire 
operational code appeared in these indices. The tendency to rely on conflictual 
tactics, such as opposing and threatening other political actors, that Hussein and 
Abdullah possessed was close to zero. There was a small trend to punish other 
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political actors, however this was very well-balanced by more cooperative means of 
supporting and rewarding. 
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SUMMARY 
This study has attempted to determine to what extent the transition of King 
Hussein I to King Abdullah II has affected the nation's approach to the Middle East 
peace process, as well as its domestic affairs. A systematic study of comparison utilizing 
the operational codes of these two leaders as articulated in public texts has provided 
quantitative data supporting the popularly-held notion that Abdullah has demonstrated a 
somewhat similar thrust in his diplomatic relations with Israel and surrounding Arab 
nations as his father, the late King Hussein. This study also provides evidence that 
Abdullah will continue to stabilize the region with a moderate stance in the politics of the 
peace process, and that hc has a vested interest in a comprehensive peace that will benefit 
his nation. 
Additionally, several key hypotheses that have been formed on the basis of recent 
qualitative analysis were supported by this study. The first is that both Hussein and 
Abdullah shared a commitment to fulfill their goals and agendas through means which 
were in every way cooperative across national and eihnic lines. The second is that 
Abdullah had the tendency to characterize the political universe as being hostile when he 
lirst took on leadership during the transition phase, revealing the only noted point of 
departure from Hussein's policies that was discovered in this study. Third, the seemingly 
contradictory balance of each leader having attributed a large role to chance in 
influencing the political environment versus each leader also having felt the ability to 
have great control over historical development was synthesized for both Hussein and 
Abdullah, showing a special continuity across operational codes on an introspective 
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level. Fourth, the fact that, for the most part, Hussein and Abdullah did not differ in their 
operational codes either across time or between themselves means that the world can 
expect Abdullah to follow in Hussein's footsteps for taking a moderate stance in the 
region and for attempting to affect a comprehensive peace plan between the Arabs, 
Palestinians, and Israelis. Finally, both Jordanian leaders constantly chose cooperative 
tactics based in positive systems of reward and support, cementing Jordan's reputation as 
a moderate force in the region that is supportive and that understands all sides of the 
conflict. 
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APPENDIX 
July 26, 1994 — February 7, 1998: Hussein's continuous leadership 
Speech 1: Address to the Joint Session of the U. S. Congress, 26 July 1994 
Speech 2: Address to Mo'tah University, 1 June 1996 
Speech 3: Address to the Meeting of Arab Political Parties, 16 December 
1996 
February 8, 1998 — February 7, 1999: Hussein's transition period 
Speech 1: 
Speech 2: 
Speech 3: 
Address to Representatives of the German Media, 24 April 1998 
"Embracing the Future", May-June 1998 (an article in Middle East 
Insight that was based on an interview with Hussein) 
Address to the Nation of Jordan, 16 January 1999 
February 8, 1999 — February 7, 2000: Abdullah's transition period 
Speech 1: "CNN WorldView: King Abdullah of Jordan Reflects on His and 
Speech 2: 
Speech 3: 
Jordan's Future", 3 May 1999 (interview) 
Royal Crown Address, 1 November 1999 
Speech to the World Economic Forum, 30 January 2000 
February 8, 2000 — February 1, 2001: Abdullah's continuous leadership 
Speech 1: 
Speech 2: 
Speech 3: 
Speech at the CNN World Report Conference, 2 June 2000 
Addess to the Fourth Session of the Thirteenth Jordanian 
Parliament, 25 November 2000 
"Prospects for Moving Forward", Winter 2000 (Abdullah ll 2000) 
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